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Dominance in the Monty Hall Problem
Alexander V. Gnedin∗
Abstract
Elementary decision-theoretic analysis of the Monty Hall dilemma
shows that the problem has dominance. This makes possible to dis-
card nonswitching strategies, without making any assumptions on the
prior distribution of factors out of control of the decision maker. A
path to the Bayesian and the minimax decision-making environments
is then straightforward.
Suppose there is a set of ‘doors’ D with at least three elements. One door
θ ∈ D is a winning door. You will be asked to choose a door x ∈ D, and then
all doors except one door y ∈ D \ {x} will be revealed as not winning. Then
you will be asked to guess if x = θ (action match with door x) or x 6= θ
(action switch to door y). You win if your guess is correct.
The case of three doors is widely known as the Monty Hall problem. The
observation of this note is that the problem has dominance, which makes
sense of the question ‘to switch or not to switch’ even in the situations when
no prior distributions are assigned to the parameters out of control of the
decision maker. The idea is quite simple: if the guessing strategy chooses
x and in some situation plays match, so does not switch to y, then another
strategy which chooses y and plays switch all the time is at least as good
as the first whichever θ ∈ D. This simplistic view is basically right, modulo
subtleties involved in the formal definition of ‘strategy’ and ‘situation’
A strategy is a pair (x, ax) where x ∈ D and ax is a function of y ∈
D \ {x} with values ax(y) ∈ {match, switch}. For constant functions we
call (x, match) and (x, switch) single-action strategies, and call (x, switch)
always-switching strategy.
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The decision-making environment is specified by two parameters. One
parameter is the winning door θ ∈ D. Another parameter is the door y to
which switching can occur, which is a function dθ of x ∈ D , that must be
admissible in the sense that dθ(x) = θ off the diagonal θ = x, and dθ(x) 6= θ
on the diagonal θ = x.
Let W (θ, x, match) := 1(x = θ) and W (θ, x, switch) := 1(x 6= θ), where
1(· · · ) denotes indicators. A strategy (x, ax) is evaluated by the win-or-
nothing payoff function W (θ, x, ax(dθ(x))). Note that the payoff does not
depend on y = d(θ, x) explicitly. The payoff of each single-action strategy
depends on y neither explicitly nor implicitly.
Theorem The class of always-switching strategies is weakly dominant,
that is for every strategy (x, ax) there exists an always-switching strategy
(x′, switch) such that
W (θ, x′, switch) ≥ W (θ, x, ax(dθ(x)))
for all θ ∈ D and all admissible functions dθ.
Proof. If ax is not always-switching, there exists x
′ 6= x with ax(x
′) = match.
Consider the strategy (x′, switch). For θ 6= x′ we have
W (θ, x, ax(dθ(x))) ≤ 1 = W (θ, x
′, switch).
For θ = x′ we have W (x′, x′, switch) = 0, but then also
W (θ, x, ax(dθ(x))) = W (x
′, x, ax(x
′)) = W (x′, x, match) = 0,
since by the admissibility dθ(x) = x
′.
In the Bayesian setting of the decision problem the winning door Θ and
the door Y to which switching is offered are random variables with given
probability distributions, with distribution of Y defined conditionally on the
decision variable x and Θ, with account of the rule Y = Θ in the event Θ 6= x.
Assuming D finite, the distributions can be specified by a probability mass
function pθ and transition probabilities qθ,y for θ ∈ D, y ∈ D\{θ}. A Bayesian
strategy is the always-switching strategy (θ∗, switch), where θ∗ minimizes
pθ. The optimality readily follows by first noting that by the dominance the
class of always-switching strategies is optimal, then noting that the winning
probability with (x, switch) is 1−px, i.e. the probability of the event Θ 6= x
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that the winning door is not the one you have chosen before facing the ‘to
switch or not to switch’ dilemma.
Let n be the cardinality of D (n ≥ 3). Since maxx∈D(1− px) ≥ (n− 1)/n
it is clear that in the worst-case the distribution of Θ is uniform on D,
and the minimax probability of winning the prize is v := (n− 1)/n. If Θ is
uniform, then every always-switching strategy yields v, no matter what is the
distribution of Y . On the other hand, if the decision-maker applies the mixed
strategy (X, switch) with X uniformly distributed, then the probability to
win is v for arbitrary (Θ, Y ) (independent of X). It follows that in the zero-
sum setting of the decision problem, every saddle-point solution has the form
(X, switch)-versus-(Θ, Y ), with X and Θ uniformly distributed and the law
of Y determined by arbitrary transition probabilities. The value of this game
is then v = (n− 1)/n.
The Monty Hall problem (MHP) and its numerous variants, all involving proba-
bilities, are summarized on the Wikipedia MHP page. We refer to [1] for a recent
critical analysis of the textbook solutions and the history of the MHP.
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